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Abstract
This paper identifies matches on the male and female professional tennis tours in which one
player faces a high payoff from being “on the bubble” of direct entry into one of the lucrative
Grand Slam tournaments, while their opposition does not. Analyzing over 378,000 matches
provides strong evidence for corrupt behavior on the men’s tour, as bubble players are sub-
stantially more likely to beat better ranked opponents when a win is desperately needed.
However, we find no such evidence on the women’s tour. These results prevail throughout a
series of extensions and robustness checks, highlighting gender differences regarding corrupt
and unethical behavior, but also concerning collusion. We especially find evidence for collu-
sion once monetary incentives are further increased. Finally, the market for sports betting
does not seem to be aware of this phenomenon, suggesting a market imperfection and further
confirming our suspicion of irregular activities in men’s tennis.
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1 Introduction
Unethical behavior is difficult to detect. Although experiments and surveys can help us analyze
cheating or corrupt behavior, their results remain subject to criticism.1 Actual labor market
outcomes, on the other hand, reveal one’s preferences and actions quite clearly. Unfortunately,
outcomes in conventional workplaces usually do not allow for identifying corrupt activities,
especially if workers know that they are monitored. Ideally a researcher would like to be able
to study corrupt behavior in real life without informing workers of the possibility to identify
unethical actions.
The following pages analyze corrupt behavior in professional tennis, a sport where men
and women compete for comparable payoffs in separated labor markets. Our empirical strategy
exploits the unique structure of professional tennis, creating one particular scenario where match
fixing between opponents can be beneficial. Specifically, we take advantage of the fact that
entering one of the four lucrative Grand Slam tournaments requires a certain ranking. At
the entry deadline only the highest ranked 104 players directly qualify for a spot in the main
draw, where a player is guaranteed approximately US$30,000 in prize money. As players ranked
around #100 and lower are earning at best around US$300,000 per year (before subtracting
costs), participation in the four Grand Slam tournaments alone can guarantee a player about
35 to 50 percent of their annual income.2 Thus, some encounters in tournaments before Grand
Slam deadlines are marked by one player desperately needing a win to collect the necessary
ranking points, whereas the opponent merely competes for the prize money offered at the current
tournament.
Our study draws from a rich sample of over 378,000 total tennis matches on the men’s
Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP) and the Women’s Tennis Association (WTA) Tours,
1For instance, an experimental setup in a laboratory may not necessarily produce representative behavior from
individuals. Important studies analyzing corrupt behavior in an experimental setting include Fisman and Miguel
(2007) and Barr and Serra (2010), who find that cultural origin can predict corrupt behavior. Mocan (2008)
and Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2013) provide interesting analyses using micro-level survey data, although Olken
(2009) finds corruption perception is not necessarily representative of reality. For summaries of the literature on
corruption determinants, one may consider Treisman (2000) or, more recently, Serra (2006).
2Numerous popular press articles have highlighted the strong income divide between the absolute top tennis
players and players ranked outside the top 100 (most recently Bednall, 2015). It is important to note that prize
income is stated before taxes and expenses for traveling, coaches, stringing rackets, etc. The International Tennis
Federation (ITF) estimates the annual costs of a full tennis professional around US$160,000 (see Bednall, 2015).
Most players compete in about 20 to 35 events per year. See websites of the respective professional tours.
1
containing all career matches of players ranked in their official listings as of September 21, 2014.
Our analysis reveals male players on the bubble are substantially more likely to beat a higher
ranked opponent than in other, regular matches (41 percent versus 34 percent). We do not
find this anomaly for the female tour. Further evidence comes from the fact that these results
become even more pronounced following the 2012 season, when the guaranteed prize money for
participants of Grand Slam tournaments increased markedly.
Our findings contribute to two distinct areas of research within economics. First, sport is not
exempt from corrupt and unethical behavior. Following seminal papers by Duggan and Levitt
(2002) and Wolfers (2006), who study unethical behavior in sumo wrestling and basketball,
this paper is, to our knowledge, the first to systematically analyze professional tennis. Second,
we add to the existing literature surrounding gender differences in ethical behavior. Isolating
gender differences in a conventional workplace environment becomes difficult, as men and women
usually compete for the same jobs and work side-by-side. Furthermore, individual outcomes are
difficult to observe in many occupational areas, both for lack of clear performance measures and
separating individual contributions from team efforts. However, the sport of tennis produces a
unique work environment, where these problems are minimized. Most importantly, tennis is a
single sport where individual results are easily observed and skewing a desired result becomes
easier than in a team environment. In addition, tennis is one of the few sports where men and
women earn comparable amounts of compensation, yet compete in separated events.3
Although there exists some evidence that women tend to value ethical behavior more so
than men, most of these findings are drawn from surveys (e.g., Grove et al., 2011) or aggregate
country level data (Swamy et al., 2001; Dollar et al., 2001).4 However, it is difficult to interpret
the results from these analyses as causal, since surveys only exhibit stated preferences, not re-
vealed preferences evaluating actions. Similarly, studies using aggregated data can be subject to
endogeneity, as potentially omitted variables and reverse causality can disguise causal inferences.
Our study, on the other hand, analyzes revealed preferences (matches on the professional tours)
and profits from a random assignment of bubble matches, as matches are assigned by random
3Golf may be the only other exception and recently the economics literature has started to exploit these unique
work environments for systematic studies. For instance, Brown et al. (2011) analyzes superstar effects when Tiger
Woods participates in a tournament.
4Niederle, 2014 provides an up-to-date summary of the existing research on gender differences.
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drawing at the beginning of a tournament.
The paper proceeds by providing a brief background of professional tennis, focusing on the
above described scenarios of bubble matches. Section 3 introduces our sample data and sketches
our empirical strategy. Sections 4 and 5 present our main findings. Section 6 considers alternative
explanations and Section 7 analyzes whether betting markets are aware of an anomaly in bubble
matches. Finally, we conclude with a short discussion in Section 8.
2 Background
The majority of tournaments on the men’s professional tennis tour are organized by the ATP
(founded in 1972), whereas the best female professionals compete in events organized by the
WTA (founded in 1973). Both tours are characterized by tournaments of differing categories of
total prize money and earned ranking points. The most prestigious tournaments are the four
Grand Slams: the Australian Open, the French Open, Wimbledon, and the US Open. The overall
prize money at these four major tournaments is substantial: in 2013, players were paid a total of
A$30,000,000 (Australian Open), e22,042,200 (French Open), £22,560,000 (Wimbledon), and
US$34,252,000. (Prize money for men and women is equal at these tournaments.) Although
these events are technically organized by the International Tennis Federation (ITF, founded in
1913), all ranking points obtained count for the ATP or the WTA tour.
2.1 Structure of Tournaments, Prize Money, and Rankings
Below the Grand Slams, both respective professional tours organize numerous smaller tour-
naments. For the males these are, in descending order of importance, the ATP tournament
categories 1000 (9 tournaments in 2013), 500 (11 tournaments), and 250 (40 tournaments). Be-
low these main ATP tournaments players earn points and prize money at so-called Challengers
and Futures tournaments. The lowest group of tournaments (Futures) is officially organized by
the ITF and every novice tennis player will begin here to earn their first ranking points in order
to move up the rankings. In terms of financial incentives, these events are usually endowed with
a total prize money of US$10,000 or US$15,000. Similarly for the women, WTA tournaments of
varying importance are organized throughout the year, as well as the smallest events organized
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by the ITF.
Since prize money and ranking points are increasing with the importance of the tournament,
players are naturally seeking to compete in the highest-order events. The four Grand Slam
tournaments clearly mark the highest category, where even first round losers earn a paycheck
between US$22,538 (Australian Open) and US$36,635 (Wimbledon) as of 2013.5 If a player
manages to win the first round and loses in the subsequent match, s/he earns between US$37,200
(Australian Open) and US$59,200 (Wimbledon). Simply reaching the main draws of all four
Grand Slams in 2013 guaranteed a player about US$120,000. As a comparison, the athlete
who finished the 2013 season as the 101st best player, Jesse Huta Galung (Netherlands), earned
US$107,888 throughout the year. Thus, pure participation in all four Grand Slam tournaments
would account for more than his entire annual income.6 Similarly, the #101 on the WTA Tour,
Nadiia Kichenok (Ukraine) earned US$75,913 in prize money throughout 2013.
As a comparison, losing in the first round of the next highest ranked tournament event – the
BNP Paribas Open – produces a paycheck of US$11,000, not even one third of the minimum
prize money given out at Wimbledon. (Once again, this prize money applies equally to men and
women.) Similarly, even winning a Challenger tournament on the ATP tour guarantees a payoff
of only about US$5,000 to US$15,000 – not even half the amount earned from losing in the first
round at Wimbledon. The distribution of prize money in Grand Slams, compared to other tour
events, has frequently been discussed in the popular press (e.g., see Oddo, 2013).
In summary, entering the main draw of a Grand Slam tournament is associated with a sizable
payday for male and female tennis professionals – a fact that has recently been pointed out in the
popular press (Bialik, 2014). However, only 128 players enter the main draw. More precisely,
only the best 104 players enter directly with the entry deadline determined six weeks before
the main draw of the respective Grand Slam event. Lower ranked players have the chance to
compete in a qualifying tournament for 16 additional spots, whereas the remaining 8 spots are
5All conversions to US$ from hereon are made at exchange rates taken in January 2015 to facilitate compara-
bility.
6Of course, some players also draw income beyond prize money from endorsements, exhibitions, pure prize
money tournaments, or league play (especially in Europe). As this information is difficult to gather on a com-
parable basis, our analysis ignores any incomes beyond prize money on the professional tour. Specifically for
players ranked around #100, we are confident additional incomes are comparably low on average. In this context,
various press articles highlight the financial struggles of tennis players ranked outside the very top (Morales, 2013;
Beaton, 2014; Bednall, 2015).
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given out directly by the tournament organizers as “Wild Cards.”7 However, competing in the
qualifying tournament entails winning three consecutive matches against virtually even-ranked
players for one of the spots in the main draw. For instance, out of the 16 seeds in the men’s
qualifying draw of the 2013 Australian Open only six eventually qualified. Thus, even though
one may be ranked, say, #105, a spot in the lucrative main draw may prove elusive.
2.2 Bubble Matches
Consequently, matches played at tournaments right before the entry deadline are highly impor-
tant to some players, namely those who are ranked near #104. At these matches, a player ranked
around #104 will not only compete for the respective prize money at the current tournament,
but also for the ranking points required for the lucrative entry into the upcoming Grand Slam.
However, any opponent ranked, say, #50 will only compete for the much smaller prize money
at stake in that given tournament. This is precisely where collusion may prove fruitful: the
player needing additional ranking points to make the cutoff will have an incentive to offer an
otherwise higher ranked (and presumably better) player some reward for letting him win. Note
that as draws at all tournaments are produced randomly, bubble matches arise randomly and it
is difficult to argue that one can willingly select into the situation of a bubble match.
To get an idea of rankings and points, Table 1 provides an overview of the rankings from
#95 to #114 for both tours at the end of the 2013 season. Notice that differences between one
ranking spot could be as little as one point. Regarding the points awarded at different rounds
for both tours, Tables A1 and A2 provide a detailed overview. For example, a first round win
in a Challenger tournament for the males produces between six and ten points, whereas a win
in the final of such a tournament would return between 32 and 50 points.
In the following, we label matches where the lower ranked player (the underdog) is ranked
between 94 and 114 (ten spots below and above the cutoff) in the two weeks before entry
deadlines for the respective Grand Slam tournaments as “bubble matches.”8 This scenario is akin
7Wild Cards are usually given to promising young talents who are not ranked highly enough yet or past stars
for whom the same applies.
8We extend this timeframe to three weeks before the entry deadline to the Australian Open because of the
scarce schedule at this point in the season. Since the Australian Open begin mid-January, the entry deadline falls
right at the end of the previous season. Our results are robust to changing the cutoff to, for example, including
twelve or fifteen spots below or above the cutoff.
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to the situation described by Duggan and Levitt (2002) who exploit the fact that sumo wrestlers
forego substantial income from finishing a tournament with a losing record. Consequently, some
wrestlers have larger incentives to win on the last day of a tournament than others.
One main advantage of our study comes from the fact that tennis is one of the few sports
producing a notable tour for female professionals. Specifically, women are able to earn very
similar amounts, most famously at the Grand Slam tournaments where prize money at all
four events has been equivalent for men and women since 2007 (e.g., see McGregor, 2014).
Consequently, the opportunity for collusion arises on both tours and we are able to assess (i)
whether generally underdogs are more likely to win in those scenarios and (ii) whether there
exist gender differences in collusive or unethical behavior.
3 Data and Methodology
Our data include information for all career matches of all male and female tennis players who
on September 21, 2014, were listed on the respective world rankings (ATP Tour for the men,
WTA Tour for the women). On the ATP Tour, this produces 217,153 career matches for 2,025
professionals. On the WTA Tour, our sample consists of 1,261 players and 161,468 matches. No-
tice that our sample includes all tournaments offering points for world rankings.9 The women’s
sample is smaller because female tennis players are usually younger (average of 22.1 years versus
23.8 for the males) and enjoy shorter careers than males.
3.1 Summary Statistics
Table 2 displays summary statistics for all captured matches on both tours. Our dependent
variable (Upset) takes on the value of one if the lower ranked player ends up winning the match.
Note that we code an upset as the lower ranked player beating a higher ranked opponent, even
though we acknowledge that this is not necessarily always considered an upset. In rare scenarios
a player could a priori be considered a favorite even though the official rankings might state
9The earliest match in our male sample took place on November 23, 1987, whereas the first match of the
female sample dates to January 30, 1989. The last match in both samples comes from the week before our
data collection (September 21, 2014). For males, this includes all ATP level tournaments (recently 1000, 500,
and 250), Challengers, Futures, and Davis Cup. For females, tournaments are categorized into WTA events,
ITF tournaments, and the Fed Cup. All data are derived from the ATP and the WTA websites (http://www.
atpworldtour.com/ and http://www.wtatennis.com/).
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Table 1: Ranks #95 to #114 at the end of the 2013 season.
Rank Name Points
Men’s Tour
95 Bedene, Aljaz 573
96 Young, Donald 569
97 Klahn, Bradley 568
98 Stakhovsky, Sergiy 554
99 Falla, Alejandro 552
100 Harrison, Ryan 549
101 Huta Galung, Jesse 549
102 Sock, Jack 545
103 Soeda, Go 543
104 Kavcic, Blaz 542
105 Llodra, Michael 541
106 Hajek, Jan 540
107 Struff, Jan-Lennard 523
108 Klizan, Martin 518
109 Lorenzi, Paolo 515
110 Goffin, David 510
111 Brown, Dustin 506
112 Haider-Maurer, Andreas 506
113 Donskoy, Evgeny 493
114 Kudla, Denis 491
Women’s Tour
95 Pfizenmaier, Dinah 698
96 Vekic, Donna 696
97 Pereira, Teliana 682
98 Giorgi, Camila 671
99 Razzano, Virginie 666
100 Medina Garrigues, Annabel 665
101 Kichenok, Nadiia 643
102 Arruabarrena, Lara 641
103 Duque-Marin˜o, Mariana 631
104 Petrova, Nadia 628
105 Dolonc, Vesna 627
106 Minella, Mandy 621
107 Martic, Petra 608
108 Pironkova, Tsvetana 600
109 Putintseva, Yulia 597
110 Lucic-Baroni, Mirjana 595
111 Majeric, Tadeja 594
112 Van Uytvanck, Alison 594
113 Vandeweghe, Coco 591
114 Konta, Johanna 586
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otherwise. As a famous example, consider grass court events, most notably Wimbledon, that
have been notorious for providing unusual playing conditions (“faster” courts compared to other
surfaces). Naturally, different conditions favor different styles of play and especially clay court
specialists, most prominently from Spain, have in the past been most vulnerable to losing against
lower ranked opponents on fast surfaces.10 However, for the purpose of a consistent analysis,
we consider a player as the favorite when facing lower ranked opponents throughout the paper.
In our regression analysis we control for potentially confounding features, such as ranking gaps
and surfaces.
Table 2: Summary statistics.
Men’s Tour Women’s Tour
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Upset 0.338 (0.473) 0.359 (0.480)
Bubble match 0.002 (0.048) 0.003 (0.057)
Rank of favorite 358 (274) 280 (223)
Rank of underdog 655 (472) 467 (331)
Never played before 0.702 (0.457) 0.751 (0.433)
Never beaten favorite 0.147 (0.354) 0.129 (0.336)
Same country 0.043 (0.203) 0.105 (0.307)
Grand Slam 0.042 (0.201) 0.066 (0.248)
N 217,153 161,468
In general, we only observe an upset in 33.8 percent of the matches on the ATP Tour – a value
that is relatively comparable to that derived from WTA matches (35.9 percent). The second
row displays the frequency of what we label as bubble matches: encounters within two weeks
prior to an entry deadline to a Grand Slam tournament where the underdog is ranked between
#94 and #114.11 Note that only 0.2 and 0.3 percent of all matches in our sample fall under
10For example, consider an article in the New York Times describing the threat by several Spanish players to
boycott Wimbledon in 2000 (NYT, 2000).
11For the Australian Open we include tournaments held three weeks before the entry deadline since this marks
the end of the annual season on both the ATP and the WTA Tour. As the Australian Open, the first of the
Grand Slam tournaments in the calendar year, take place mid-January, the entry deadline (6 weeks before the
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this category (492 and 518 matches, respectively). In alternative specifications (available upon
request), we also tested for different cutoffs for bubble players, such as extending the respective
ranking to #124 or excluding players ranked #94 to #103. The derived results are consistent
with our main findings.
Table 2 also displays summary statistics of our control variables, such as rankings, whether
the two contestants have faced each other on the professional tour before, whether the underdog
has beaten the favorite before, and whether both players come from the same country. Since
there are less women ranked officially (1,261 as opposed to 2,025 males) at the time of data
collection, the average rankings are consequently better for the females. Finally, 4.2 percent
of the men’s matches are Grand Slam matches, whereas 6.6 percent of women’s matches are
contested at one of the four major tennis tournaments.
3.2 The Frequency of Upsets in Bubble versus Non-Bubble Matches
Table 3 provides some basic comparisons in terms of the frequency of upsets. Panel A considers
the entire sample and we can already spot an interesting difference between the male and female
tour. For the males, the probability of an upset is substantially higher in a bubble match, i.e.,
when an upset is particularly lucrative for the underdog. The frequency of an upset now rises to
almost 42 percent, as opposed to 34 percent in regular matches. This difference is strongly rele-
vant in a statistical sense, as indicated by the results from a t-test assuming that the probability
of an upset was equally distributed within bubble matches and regular encounters. Column (2)
then displays the same statistics for the WTA Tour and we do not find any meaningful anomaly
within bubble matches.
Panel B only considers those tournaments taking place in the two weeks before the respective
entry deadline for one of the Grand Slam tournaments (three weeks for the Australian Open),
labeled as crucial tournaments. Here again, we observe the same pattern: if an underdog
is ranked within the critical range of making the main draw the probability of winning rises
by almost eight percentage points on the men’s tour. Once again, we do not observe this
phenomenon for the women’s tour.
main draw starts) is scheduled at the end of November. However, there are very few tournaments scheduled for
the end of November as the season comes to a close. All our results are robust to just using a two week window
for the Australian Open as well.
9
Table 3: Comparing bubble matches to regular matches.
Variable Upset Upset
Men’s Tour Women’s Tour
Panel A: All Matches
Mean Regular Match 0.338 0.359
N (216,661) (160,950)
Mean Bubble Match 0.417 0.363
N (492) (518)
T-Test Regular = Bubble Match (p-value) 0.000∗∗∗ 0.862
Panel B: Only Crucial Tournaments
Mean Regular Match 0.339 0.357
N (31,923) (21,893)
Mean Bubble Match 0.417 0.363
N (492) (518)
T-Test Regular = Bubble Match (p-value) 0.000∗∗∗ 0.788
Panel C: All Matches
Mean Regular Tournament 0.338 0.360
N (184,738) (139,057)
Mean Crucial Tournament 0.341 0.358
N (32,415) (22,411)
T-Test Regular = Crucial Tournament (p-value) 0.340 0.514
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Finally, in Panel C we also compare the general probability of an upset in a crucial tourna-
ment relative to regular tournaments. After all, it may be possible that these tournaments are
especially prone to underdogs beating favorites, possibly for another exogenous reason, such as
the previously mentioned particularity of grass court tournaments. Upsets do not seem to be
more likely in those tournaments, neither for the males nor the females. Thus, this preliminary
statistical evidence suggests those tournaments placed crucially right before the entry deadline
to a Grand Slam event are not per se different from other, regular tour events.
However, these basic statistical comparisons could be misleading if other, confounding factors
are influencing the probability of an upset. For example, the actual rankings of both players
are important as a ranking difference of only a few spots may make for a more equal match-up
as opposed to, say, a difference of several hundred spots. To further investigate our research
question, we now turn to the results from our regression analyses. Specifically, we present findings
from logit regressions estimating the probability of an upset as a function of several regressors,
such as ranking parameters, the personal history between both players, surface fixed effects,
and time trends. Finally, we apply additional regression techniques introduced throughout the
empirical sections.
4 Main Results
Table 4 presents our basic results for the men’s (columns 1 through 4) and the women’s tour
(5 through 8), displaying marginal effects from logit regressions. For either sample, we start
by estimating a univariate logit regression where a dummy variable for a bubble match is used
to predict the probability of an upset, i.e., a win by the lower ranked player. Indeed bubble
matches are 7.5 percent more likely to see an upset on the men’s tour. This result is statistically
relevant at the one percent level. However, the regression analyzing the female sample (column
5) produces a coefficient far from conventional levels of statistical significance. In terms of
magnitude, the estimate only produces about one twentieth of the coefficient generated by the
regression using the male data.
For the men, columns (2) through (4) display coefficients gradually adding control variables.
We first control for the ranking of the favorite (linear and squared) and the difference in ranking
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between both players. Note that the coefficient on bubble matches decreases by almost one third,
yet retains its statistical power. Further, column (3) adds categorical variables for whether (i)
both players have faced each other before, (ii) the underdog has beaten the favorite before,
and (iii) both players compete for the same country. Finally, column (4) controls for a dummy
indicating Grand Slam tournaments, surface fixed effects (carpet, clay, and grass with hard
courts forming the reference category), and time trends (linear and squared). In this most
complete estimation, bubble matches are 4.8 percent more likely to end with an upset compared
to any other matches on the men’s tour.
For the women, on the other hand, we find no evidence of bubble matches being any more
likely to result in an upset than regular matches. Adding the same set of control variables,
columns (6) through (8) continue to produce a relationship that is not statistically different from
zero. Thus, there seem to be systematic differences in the result of bubble matches between the
male and the female tennis tour.
Finally, we want to briefly discuss the implications of the associated control variables. In fact,
all remaining regressors return almost identical conclusions for the male and the female sample.
For instance, upsets are less likely in Grand Slam tournaments – a result that seems fairly
intuitive. As the winner in Grand Slam matches is determined by winning three sets (best-of-
five), in regular tournaments one only needs to win two sets (best-of-three). Thus, favorites are
more likely to emerge victoriously when given more time to perform, whereas winning “only” two
sets is easier for an underdog, as opposed to having to win three sets. Further, if the underdog
has never beaten their opponent before (at least on the professional tour) an upset becomes
substantially less likely. In the following analysis, we only display the relevant coefficients to
facilitate readability, yet all results of the remaining correlates confirm the results from Table
4 (available upon request). With these results in hand, we now move to extensions, alternative
specifications, and robustness checks.
5 Extensions and Robustness Checks
So far, we have provided evidence of an upset in a bubble match being systematically more
likely than in a regular match on the men’s tour, whereas this is not the case on the women’s
13
tour. The interpretation of this finding may lead one to believe male players could collude in a
bubble match situation or, in other words, the favorite may let the underdog win if stakes are
substantially increased for his opponent. Note the importance of a bubble match only applies
to one player – the underdog. For the favorite, the official payoff of winning the match is purely
the respective prize money at the current tournament – a reward that is substantially lower
than the ticket into the main draw of the upcoming Grand Slam (the looming reward for the
underdog). This section now considers several extensions and alternative specifications of this
hypothesis.
5.1 The Likelihood of a Tiebreak
Another, more nuanced way to test whether the outcomes in bubble matches are in any way
different from regular matches is to analyze specific scores. In particular, non-Grand Slam
matches are played in a best-of-three sets format, where a player wins a set when reaching six
games with a difference of two games (for example, 6-4). However, if a set reaches a score of
6-6 a so-called tiebreak is played, where the first to seven points wins (with a difference of two
points). This particular form of competition is known to be a very close encounter where every
point counts. Now, if we were to assume there exists some sort of arrangement between both
players before a match, then we would expect tiebreaks, the closest form of deciding the winner
of a set, to be less prevalent than in other, regular matches.
Table 5 displays the results from logit regressions estimating the likelihood of at least one
tiebreak occurring in a match. Again, columns (1) through (4) consider the male sample and
(5) through (8) analyze the female sample. The first two columns consider all non-Grand
Slam matches of our respective samples, including the dummy variable for bubble matches, a
binary indicator for upsets, and an interaction term between the two.12 The intuition here is
to specifically evaluate the upsets in bubble matches where match fixing may have potentially
occurred. Indeed, we find tiebreaks to be rare (12.8 percent less likely) in those bubble matches
where the underdog prevails. This result virtually remains unchanged when including all control
variables presented in Table 4. Note that we exclude about 7.7 percent of our sample matches
12As Grand Slam matches are competed in a best-of-five set format, we exclude them from this particular
analysis.
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that have been terminated either by injury, withdrawal, or default. As for the women’s tour
(columns 5 and 6), we find no evidence of tiebreaks being less likely in those bubble matches
that eventually result in an upset.
As a further robustness check, we then only analyze the upsets for either sample. Here again,
upsets in bubble matches on the men’s tour are less likely to witness a tiebreak – a result that is
statistically relevant on the one percent level. In terms of magnitude, upsets in bubble matches
are almost 10 percent less likely to exhibit at least one tiebreak. As before, we find no such
evidence on the WTA Tour. This strengthens the argument of arrangements taking place in a
non-trivial amount of bubble matches.
5.2 Are Bubble Matches Different in Other Aspects?
The fact that upsets are more likely in bubble matches does not necessarily mean collusion be-
tween both players occurs. For instance, bubble matches could systematically differ from regular
matches in other characteristics – an explanation that is difficult to filter out in generic logit
regressions. Specifically, the relationship between any other control variable and the probability
of an upset is by assumption identical in bubble matches and in regular matches in our main
estimation framework.
However, it is possible to technically distinguish between two sorts of observations within
a sample by using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (see Oaxaca, 1973, and Blinder, 1973;
also see Grove et al., 2011, for a recent application). Although traditionally used to trace out
differences across gender or race in wage estimations, the technique can be applied to any (larger)
sample where we can exogenously distinguish between two different types of observations. Given
the focus of our paper, it comes naturally to distinguish between regular and bubble matches.
As a result, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition produces two main coefficients explaining
the difference between the probability of an upset in bubble versus regular matches: one that
displays how much is explained by endowments (other characteristics, such as rankings) and
another that explains how much is explained by coefficients (i.e., purely the fact of one match
being a bubble match).13
13In Stata, we apply the Oaxaca command, as introduced by Jann (2008). Using a more refined econometric
framework for estimating binary outcome variables, provided by Sinning et al. (2008), produces very similar results
(about 75 percent of the difference in upset probability being explained by coefficients, rather than characteristics).
15
T
a
b
le
5
:
R
es
u
lt
s
fr
om
L
og
it
re
gr
es
si
on
s
p
re
d
ic
ti
n
g
th
e
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
of
at
le
as
t
on
e
ti
e-
b
re
ak
in
th
e
m
at
ch
.
M
en
’s
T
o
u
r
W
o
m
en
’s
T
o
u
r
A
ll
N
o
n
-G
ra
n
d
S
la
m
A
ll
U
p
se
ts
in
A
ll
N
o
n
-G
ra
n
d
S
la
m
A
ll
U
p
se
ts
in
M
a
tc
h
es
N
o
n
-G
ra
n
d
S
la
m
M
a
tc
h
es
M
a
tc
h
es
N
o
n
-G
ra
n
d
S
la
m
M
a
tc
h
es
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
B
u
b
b
le
m
a
tc
h
0
.0
6
6
∗∗
∗
0
.0
2
5
-0
.0
6
9
∗
-0
.0
9
6
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
1
3
0
.0
4
2
0
.0
2
2
(0
.0
2
5
)
(0
.0
2
5
)
(0
.0
3
5
)
(0
.0
3
5
)
(0
.0
2
1
)
(0
.0
2
1
)
(0
.0
2
7
)
(0
.0
2
7
)
U
p
se
t
0
.0
7
0
∗∗
∗
0
.0
6
0
∗∗
∗
0
.0
3
9
∗∗
∗
0
.0
3
5
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
B
u
b
b
le
m
a
tc
h
×
U
p
se
t
-0
.1
2
8
∗∗
∗
-0
.1
1
8
∗∗
∗
0
.0
3
6
0
.0
3
8
(0
.0
4
1
)
(0
.0
4
1
)
(0
.0
3
2
)
(0
.0
3
2
)
C
o
n
tr
o
l
v
a
ri
a
b
le
sa
y
es
y
es
y
es
y
es
N
2
0
0
,4
1
6
2
0
0
,3
5
6
6
6
,9
4
7
6
6
,9
3
4
1
4
6
,9
5
7
1
4
6
,9
2
0
5
2
,4
9
8
5
2
,4
9
2
N
o
te
s:
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
∗
p
<
0
.1
0
,
∗∗
p
<
0
.0
5
,
∗∗
∗
p
<
0
.0
1
.
a
In
cl
u
d
es
ra
n
k
in
g
o
f
th
e
fa
v
o
ri
te
(l
in
ea
r
a
n
d
sq
u
a
re
d
),
ra
n
k
in
g
g
a
p
,
n
ev
er
p
la
y
ed
b
ef
o
re
,
n
ev
er
b
ea
te
n
fa
v
o
ri
te
,
sa
m
e
co
u
n
tr
y,
su
rf
a
ce
F
E
,
ti
m
e
tr
en
d
(l
in
ea
r
a
n
d
sq
u
a
re
d
).
16
Table 6 displays the results subsequently incorporating our control variables. Overall, the
difference between the probability of an upset in a regular match versus a bubble match comes
out to be about 7.9 percentage points (41.7 minus 33.8 percent). As seen previously, that
difference is statistically powerful, indicating that we observe a much higher likelihood of an
upset in matches where the underdog is on the bubble. Note that coefficients are able to explain
between 68 and 75 percent of that difference, depending on the set of control variables used
(0.054 or 0.059 of 0.079). Thus, bubble matches are more likely to end in an upset purely
because of their status as bubble matches, but not because of other surrounding characteristics,
as endowments are not statistically relevant.
5.3 Relating Bubble Matches to Prize Money
Until now, we have analyzed a general difference between bubble matches and regular tour
matches. However, the prize money structure of Grand Slam tournaments changed substantially
in recent years. Although reaching the main draw of a Grand Slam has long been a milestone
for obtaining substantial cash rewards, there have been sizable recent increases in monetary
payments (for instance, consider Oddo, 2013, who highlights these changes are unique to Grand
Slam tournaments). In fact, the Players Associations (ATP and WTA) agreed on not only a
major raise in prize money at Grand Slam tournaments, but also on a more even distribution
towards those players who lose early. Specifically, consider a comparison of the prize money
awarded to a first-round loser in each of the four Grand Slam events in the past five years,
displayed in Figure 1.
Although the minimal prize money from reaching the main draw has been high previously
relative to other tournaments, there have been major changes in prize money after 2012 for at
least three of the four major events. The Australian Open, Wimbledon, and the US Open each
increased the sum awarded to a first-round loser by 33, 62, and 39 percent, respectively. If
prize money at the elusive Grand Slam tournaments was indeed a motivation to collude with an
opponent, we would expect to see more upsets in bubble matches after the prize money increased
significantly.
As a reference point and baseline in all decompositions, we select regular matches, as these constitute the vast
majority of our samples.
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Table 6: Results from Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions for the men’s tour, predicting the prob-
ability of an upset.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regular Match 0.338∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Bubble Match 0.417∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Difference -0.079∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Endowments 3.093 3.280 3.476 3.122
(4.947) (4.987) (5.013) (5.062)
Coefficients -0.059∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗ -0.054∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Interaction -3.113 -3.299 -3.500 -3.146
(4.947) (4.987) (5.013) (5.062)
Control Variables
Rankinga yes yes yes yes
Head-2-Headb yes yes yes
Grand Slam, Surface FE yes yes
Time trend yes
(linear & squared)
N 217,153 217,153 217,091 217,091
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
aIncludes rank of favorite, (rank of favorite)2, and ranking gap.
bIncludes never played before, never beaten before, and same country.
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Figure 1: Prize Money for 1st Round Losers in Grand Slam Tournaments (local currencies).
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Table 7 provides basic summary statistics when splitting our samples into before and after
the entry deadline for the 2013 Australian Open, when the increase in prize money occurred.
Interestingly, upsets in bubble matches were more likely on the men’s tour before (about 40
percent versus 34.3 percent), but recently this trend has become even more pronounced. In fact,
after the increase in prize money at Grand Slam tournaments nearly 50 percent of all bubble
matches end in an upset. Thus, since the 2013 Australian Open entry deadline we see upsets in
about 32 percent of all matches, but in nearly every other bubble match.
Table 7: Probability of upsets before and after the entry deadline for the 2013 Australian Open.
Variable Upset Upset
Men’s Tour Women’s Tour
Panel A: All Matches Before AO 2013 Entry Deadline
Mean Regular Match 0.343 0.360
N (167,068) (128,823)
Mean Bubble Match 0.398 0.360
N (379) (425)
T-Test Regular = Bubble Match (p-value) 0.024∗∗ 0.988
Panel B: All Matches Since AO 2013 Entry Deadline
Mean Regular Match 0.320 0.355
N (49,593) (32,127)
Mean Bubble Match 0.478 0.376
N (113) (93)
T-Test Regular = Bubble Match (p-value) 0.000∗∗∗ 0.666
We now test these statistical irregularities in a logit regression framework, controlling for
potentially confounding factors. The results displayed in Table 8 further confirm our suspicion:
upsets in bubble matches on the men’s tour are especially prevalent after prize money increases
at the beginning of the 2013 season. In fact, before that change the respective coefficient is not
significant on conventional levels, although still somewhat sizable at about 0.03. Remember that
20
the respective coefficient from the baseline regression in Table 4 reaches a magnitude of 0.048.
Since the 2013 Australian Open, however, that coefficient increases markedly to 0.1, meaning a
bubble match is ten percent more likely to produce an upset than any other match. Once again,
we observe none of these dynamics for the female data in columns (3) and (4). These results
lend further support to the idea that male tennis players tend to collude and fix matches, as the
incidence of bubble matches ending in an upset increases when the stakes are higher.
Table 8: Predicting the probability of an upset on the men’s tour, i.e., the lower ranked player
beating the higher ranked player. Displaying marginal effects.
Men’s Tour Women’s Tour
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Since AO 2013 Before AO 2013 Since AO 2013 Before AO 2013
Bubble Match 0.101∗∗ 0.030 0.032 0.020
(0.040) (0.023) (0.048) (0.023)
Control variablesa yes yes yes yes
N 49,668 167,423 32,220 129,211
Log lik. -29,789.56 -103,791.35 -20,868.98 -84,010.516
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
aIncludes rank of favorite, (rank of favorite)2, ranking gap, never played before
never beaten before, same country, Grand Slam, and surface FE.
6 Alternative Explanations
We now consider two natural explanations for why an underdog may win an ATP match carrying
such far-reaching consequences for him. First, the match could hold lower marginal benefit for
the favorite and he may choose to not compete fully, potentially saving his energy. Second, it
may be possible that the underdog places more effort into this specific match. For instance, he
may choose to prepare more extensively for this particular tournament knowing of its importance
or compete harder. The following discussion addresses both explanations.
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6.1 Are the Losers Under-performing?
First, we form a subsample identifying those players who at some point in their career lost to
a player on the bubble. These players are the potential recipients of match fixing, presumably
letting the lower ranked opponent win for a reward. We then select all career matches where
those players have been the favorite. Specifically, we wish to check whether these players are
just particularly prone to upsets in comparable matches. For instance, it could be that those
players only compete heavily if a big reward is on the line, such as in Grand Slam events. In
smaller tournaments, on the other hand, they may choose to put in a lower level of effort. If
this were the case, our prior findings would be spurious.
Table 9 displays results from logit regression estimating the probability of an upset, where
we once again include a dummy variable for bubble matches. We find little evidence for this
subsample of players to be generally more prone to losing to underdogs, as an upset remains
substantially more likely in a bubble match. This result is robust to the inclusion of all control
variables, such as ranking characteristics, head-to-head history, surface fixed effects, and time
trends. Column (6) then also includes Grand Slam matches and the coefficient of interest
remains virtually unchanged. As before, Grand Slam matches are less likely to witness an upset,
consistent with our intuition. These results show it is the particular characteristic of a bubble
match for the lower ranked opponent driving the upset and not an intrinsic feature of the favorite
who could be prone to losing to underdogs from time to time. This further lends evidence to the
argument of some favorites letting their opponent win in what constitutes an important match
for that opponent.
6.2 Are the Winners Over-performing?
Second, it may be possible that the player on the bubble puts in an extra effort. This explanation
comes as fairly intuitive, as higher payoffs have been shown to provoke better effort (Lazear,
2000). Thus, we now derive a subsample that (i) includes only those players who at some point
won a match against a higher ranked opponent in what constitutes a bubble match for them;
and (ii) incorporates high-stakes matches (i.e., where similar amounts of prize money are at
stake) where the respective player has been an underdog. In particular, we include Grand Slam
matches in which every match won in the main draw increases the previous prize money by
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Table 9: Considering the performance of ATP players who at some point in their career lost to
a lower ranked opponent in what constitutes a bubble match for their opponent. This
subsample excludes Grand Slams with the exception of column (6) that incorporates
all their matches. Displaying marginal effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bubble Match 0.171∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Rankinga yes yes yes yes yes yes
Head-2-Headb yes yes yes yes
Surface FE yes yes yes
Time trend yes yes
(linear and squared)
Grand Slam -0.056∗∗∗
(0.008)
N 38,856 38,856 38,856 38,850 38,850 43,184
Log lik. -24,375.59 -23,711.33 -23,668.67 -23,664.28 -23,663.00 -26,206.47
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
aIncludes rank of favorite, (rank of favorite)2, ranking gap, and same country.
bIncludes never played before, never beaten before, and same country.
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about 60 to 80 percent.14 Thus, we could reasonably assume that if a player puts in an extra
amount of effort in a bubble match he would try to reach that level of effort in a Grand Slam
match as well, given that the monetary reward from both matches is comparably high. Keep in
mind that winning a round in a Grand Slam tournament (or similarly reaching the main draw of
a Grand Slam tournament) guarantees one the prize money of the next round, but also provides
the opportunity to win another match and further increase prize money.
Table 10 displays the results from logit regressions, evaluating whether those players who beat
higher ranked opponents when on the bubble are generally more prone to upsetting favorites.
Columns (1) through (5) consider bubble matches and all Grand Slam matches, where payoffs
are comparable (or higher) than in bubble matches. The importance of bubble matches reveals
these players are not usually prone to produce upsets – this is only the case in bubble matches.
Thus, an increased effort level by the underdogs in bubble matches is unlikely to solely explain
our findings, since we do not observe such patterns in matches of similar importance. Further,
column (6) evaluates all career matches of one-time winners of bubble matches (not only high-
stakes encounters) and the coefficient of interest remains virtually unchanged.
7 Does the Market Know?
After evaluating several alternative explanations, we now move to a market that is closely
associated with professional sports: the betting market. In the context of our narrative, a
natural question to emerge is whether the market is aware of bubble matches being more likely
to produce upsets. To test this, we access data for 15,292 sample matches offered by bet365, one
of the world’s leading online sports betting companies. To evaluate whether bubble matches are
in any way standing out in these odds, we regress the odds offered for an upset on a dummy
variable for bubble matches and then add further controls. The results are displayed in Table
11.
In a univariate framework, bubble matches do indeed receive a higher likelihood of an upset,
indicating a general awareness of our discovered phenomenon. However, once rankings and rank-
ing gaps are added in column (2), the statistical role of bubble matches disappears completely.
14For instance, in the 2013 Australian Open, the prize money for a second round loser was A$45,500 – almost
A$20,000 more than for a first round loser.
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Table 10: Considering the performance of ATP players who at some point in their career beat a
better ranked opponent in a bubble match. This subsample includes bubble matches
and Grand Slam matches. Column (6) considers all tour matches by those players.
Displaying marginal effects..
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bubble Match 0.248∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Rankinga yes yes yes yes yes
Head-2-Headb yes yes yes yes
Surface FE yes yes yes
Time trend yes yes
(linear and squared)
Grand Slam -0.078∗∗∗
(0.011)
N 2,760 2,760 2,760 2,758 2,758 23,402
Log lik. -1703.79 -1599.17 -1593.15 -1591.68 -1588.84 -15342.82
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
aIncludes rank of favorite, (rank of favorite)2, and ranking gap.
bIncludes never played before, never beaten before, and same country.
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Table 11: OLS regressions estimating the probability given to an upset, as evaluated by the
betting markets (Bet365).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Since AO 2013
Bubble match 0.048∗∗∗ -0.008 -0.003 -0.008 -0.009 0.007
(0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.020)
Rankinga yes yes yes yes yes
Head-2-Headb yes yes yes yes
Surface FE, Grand Slam yes yes yes
Time trend yes yes
(linear and squared)
N 15,292 15,292 15,292 15,292 15,292 2,867
R2 0.001 0.260 0.297 0.307 0.309 0.372
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
aIncludes rank of favorite, (rank of favorite)2, ranking gap, and same country.
bIncludes never played before, never beaten before, and same country.
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Columns (3) to (5) then add the remaining independent variables that may affect the odds
given to an upset (head-to-head characteristics, surface fixed effects, a dummy for Grand Slams,
and time trends), but the effect from bubble matches does not differ from zero in a statistical
sense. Thus, betting markets do not seem to anticipate the higher likelihood of upsets in bubble
matches.
8 Conclusion
This paper analyzes professional tennis matches producing a unique payoff scenario where one
player can obtain a much larger monetary benefit from winning a match than their opponent.
Since only 104 players enter directly into each of the four lucrative Grand Slam tournaments,
being ranked #104 or better right before the entry deadline becomes a crucial goal for players,
on the men’s as well as on the women’s tour (ATP and WTA). Thus, in matches preceding the
entry deadline the payoff for some players becomes large, exceeding way beyond the contested
prize money at regular tournaments. Our analysis then focuses on those matches where a player
“on the bubble” is facing a better ranked opponent right before the entry deadline closes.
We find upsets (beating a higher ranked opponent) to be substantially more likely in bubble
matches on the men’s tour, but not on the women’s tour. This finding remains consistent in
all estimated specifications, suggesting that upsets in bubble matches on the men’s tour are
about five percent more likely than in an ordinary match. These findings remain robust to
controlling for several potentially confounding factors, such as the characteristics associated
with rankings, the personal head-to-head history, the tournament category, surface fixed effects,
and time trends. In addition, the likelihood of a tiebreak (the closest form of determining the
winner of a set) occurring in a match is substantially lower in those matches where the player
on the bubble needs the upset. Further, the effect becomes more notable after prize money
for participating in Grand Slam events increased substantially with the beginning of the 2013
season. Since then, underdogs have won almost 50 percent of bubble matches, as opposed to a
general likelihood of 32 percent in non-bubble matches. This further confirms our suspicion of
corrupt behavior taking place on the men’s professional tennis tour.
Finally, we find betting agencies are systematically unaware of this phenomenon, as an upset
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in a bubble match is not specifically predicted by the market. This only further strengthens the
idea of a systematic irregularity in male tennis and provides evidence for match fixing. Overall,
our results provide evidence for systematic corrupt behavior on the men’s tennis tour, but not
the women’s. Beyond the obvious implications for the sport of tennis, this further contributes
to the large literature on gender differences in corrupt behavior, collusion, and cheating.
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